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Abstract 
Work of low-skilled migrant workers from developing countries in developed economies is a growing 
phenomenon and a key political and economic issue. An extensive literature has found (for the most 
part) that these workers come from the lower part of the skill distribution. This paper revisits the 
issue, using a self-selection model, a unique data-set on migrant workers as well as on workers that 
chose not to migrate (‘stayers’), and direct estimation of the moments of the latent unobserved skill 
distributions. The main findings are that there are two dimensions to self-selection: in terms of 
observed skills, a substantial migration premium lures migrant workers, while very low returns to 
skills in the foreign economy deter skilled workers, leading to negative self-selection. In terms of 
unobservable skills, self-selection is found to be positive rather than negative. The latter finding 
entails substantial increases in mean wages and reduction in wage inequality, relative to random 
assignment and to the alternative of not migrating. The analysis also demonstrates that estimates of 
skill premia for migrants — an important issue in the immigration literature — are upward biased if 
selection is not accounted for. Relevant skills are multi-dimensional, hence assignments in this 
context are non-hierarchical. 
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The Self Selection of Migrant Workers Revisited
1 Introduction
The flow of low-skilled migrant workers from developing economies to developed ones has become a
key political and economic issue. This type of migration is a phenomenon of increasing importance
in terms of magnitude1and has animated the political debate. A major concern in this discussion is
the eﬀect of migrants on the host economy and its workers. In this context, the identity of migrant
workers is crucial. It is therefore important to determine what type of workers choose to migrate.
This paper revisits the issue of the self selection of these migrant workers. An impetus
for this investigation is provided by the diﬃculties encountered by the extensive literature on the
subject [see Borjas (1999) for a survey]. The major diﬃculties are, first, that data permitting
direct evaluation of self-selection are often unavailable; in some of the better cases, two diﬀerent
data sets (such as census data) have been used to compare migrants and stayers; second, many
of the empirical studies have not yielded direct estimates of the moments of the unobserved skills
distributions, which are crucial for the determination of the patterns of self-selection; third, many
papers do not give suﬃcient attention to the distinction between the role of observed skills and
that of unobservable skills, which is key in interpreting the data; fourth, the diﬀerences between
developed and developing economies in the jobs oﬀered and in rewarding workers for skills are
often not given due consideration. This paper attempts at addressing these diﬃculties. Doing so
it derives new results and re-interprets existing findings. It generates a consistent picture of the
(rich) patterns of migrant self-selection. In particular, it shows in what sense migrant workers are
negatively selected, as found in many studies, and in what sense they are, concurrently, positively
selected.
1Some evidence is presented below; for detailed reviews see Stalker (2000) and Zlotnik (1998).
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The paper uses the Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) formulation of the Roy (1951) self-
selection model. The model is particularly well suited for the current context as it highlights
worker heterogeneity and individual worker optimal employment decisions. The data are quarterly
labor force surveys on Palestinian workers who worked in Israel and those who worked in the local
economy (the West Bank of the Jordan river and the Gaza Strip). The employment of these mi-
grant workers bears similarity, in terms of occupations and position in the wage distribution, to the
employment of Hispanic workers in the U.S. and North African workers in Western Europe. These
data are particularly consistent with the formulations of the theoretical model, which describes
workers as choosing among occupational tasks.
The paper examines self-selection by estimating wage equations derived from the model.
The basic idea is as follows: workers select where to work according to the principle of maximizing
income. Income depends on the return to the individual’s skills (both observed skills, like education
or experience, and unobserved skills) and on market prices for a suitably defined labor supply
aggregate. Individuals sort themselves into the local or host economy and the data are conditioned
on their selection decisions. Estimation corrects for sample selection bias, which is inherent in the
model.
These wage equations — for workers employed locally and in Israel — demonstrate that self-
selection needs to be understood along two dimensions. Both of these pertain to the fact that
migrants come from a relatively poor economy and are oﬀered work in specific occupational tasks
in the relatively rich economy. In terms of observables, substantially diﬀerent return profiles for
experience and education existed in the local economy and in the Israeli economy. While in the
former they assumed a standard shape, in the latter they were low and flat. Israel, however,
lured workers by oﬀering a migration premium. This led to the self-selection of younger, less
educated workers to the Israeli economy. Hence migrants were negatively selected on education
and experience. The estimates with respect to unobservables lead to another conclusion. They
uncover moments of the latent skill distributions in the local and host economies, conditional on
the afore-mentioned observed skills, that are very reasonable: unobserved skills across the two
economies are negatively correlated and the home distribution is more dispersed. This structure is
to be expected given that migrant work in the host economy is concentrated in low-skill occupational
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tasks, while in the local economy occupations are more varied and include relatively high-skilled
tasks. Therefore, for reasons to be elaborated below, in terms of these conditional unobservables,
migrant workers are positively selected. Quantitatively, the positive selection eﬀects are substantial.
The paper makes a number of contributions:
First, it identifies the self-selection patterns of migrant workers. As discussed, it diﬀeren-
tiates between selection on observables and on unobservables. The availability of relevant data
on migrants and stayers and the use of selection bias correction place this analysis on more solid
footing relative to the existing literature on the self-selection of migrants.
Second, the results show how self-selection aﬀects estimates of return to experience and
education, which is a major issue in studies of migration. In particular, it finds that estimates
uncorrected for selection are biased. More specifically, estimates of migrant skill premia are shown
to be upward biased without the selection correction.
Third, the results show the implications of sorting via self-selection for mean wages and
wage inequality. In particular, we find selection to be positive and to generate a significant wage
premium and a reduction in wage inequality. These results stand in contrast to prevalent claims
in the immigration literature, which has emphasized negative self-selection. We are able to re-
interpret findings from other studies, claiming that the empirical findings are in fact similar. This
new interpretation is due to the fact that we directly estimate the relevant second moments of the
latent skill distribution, which are crucial for determining self selection patterns.
Fourth, the paper lends support to the approach of Willis and Rosen (1979) whereby skills
are multi-dimensional and hence lead to non-hierarchical selection of occupations. While their study
pertained to college vs. high school graduates, it will be shown below that the current context bears
similarity to theirs.
Fifth, it quantifies wage determination in a developing economy, including the earnings of
its migrant workers. The paper uncovers an aggregation bias: using aggregate, rather than sectorial
data, gives a misleading characterization of skill returns. This point may have implications for the
issue of job outsourcing to other economies, which has recently aroused much interest.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model and discusses the types of self-
selection processes involved. In particular, it defines the role of observable skill premia and the role
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of the unobservable skills distributions in dictating self-selection. Section 3 presents the essential
background for the empirical work — key facts on the Palestinian labor market, Palestinian workers
as migrant workers, and some results from previous studies. Section 4 discusses the data, the
econometric methodology, and alternative specifications. It then reports the results. The essential
contributions are provided in the subsequent sections: Section 5 discusses the implications of the
results for selection patterns both in terms of observables and in terms of unobservables. These
include issues such as the migration premium, lack of return to observed skills, the non-hierarchical
patterns of selection on unobservable skills, and wage inequality. Section 6 decomposes the wage
diﬀerential between local employment and employment in Israel, highlighting the oﬀsetting eﬀects
of the migration premium and skill premia. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The model used is based on the seminal work of Roy (1951) on self-selection. The model has been
formalized and applied to various labor market issues by Rosen (1978) and Willis and Rosen (1979).
Extensive applications to the U.S. economy, as well as theoretical extensions, are presented in
Heckman and Sedlacek (1985, 1990) whose notation is followed here. In the context of immigration,
Chiswick (1999) oﬀers a discussion of this approach within the class of the human capital models.
In sub-section 2.1 the basic model is briefly presented [for more extensive presentations see
the afore-cited references]. In sub-section 2.2, alternative possible outcomes of the self-selection
process are examined.
2.1 Self-Selection
There are two market sectors i(= 1, 2) in which workers can work. In the current context these
are the host (Israel) and source (Palestinian) economies. Agents are free to enter the sector that
gives them the highest income but are limited to work in only one sector at a time. Each sector
requires a unique sector-specific task ti. Each worker is endowed with a vector of skills (S) which
enable him or her to perform sector-specific tasks. The vector S is continuously distributed with
density g(S | Θ) where Θ is a vector of parameters. ti(S) is a non-negative function that expresses
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the amount of task a worker with the given skill endowment S can perform and is continuously
diﬀerentiable in S. Note that there is a distinction here between tasks, which are the object of
firms’ demand, and skills, which reflect the endowments of workers. Packages of skills cannot be
unbundled, and diﬀerent skills are used in diﬀerent tasks , though some skills could be equally
productive in all tasks.
Aggregating the micro supply of task to sector i yields:
Ti =
Z
ti(S)g(S | Θ)dS (1)
The output of sector i is given by:
Yi = F i(Ti,Ai) (2)
where A is a vector of non-labor inputs. The production function F is assumed to be twice
continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave in all its arguments. For a given output price Pi,
the equilibrium price of task i equals the value of the marginal product of a unit of the task in
sector i. This task price will be denoted by πi and is assumed independent of the skill distribution:
πi = Pi
∂F i
∂Ti
(3)
Wages in this set-up are given by:
lnwi(S) = lnπi + ln ti(S) (4)
Additionally, we postulate (to make the model consistent with the data) that the individ-
ual has travel costs to work that depend on a vector of location variables (L) and are assumed
proportional to wages (representing the time price of travel):
travel costs = ki(L)wi
An income-maximizing individual chooses the sector i that satisfies:
wi(1− ki(L)) > wj(1− kj(L)) (5)
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Hence:
[πiti(S)] [1− ki(L)] > [πjtj(S)] [1− kj(L)] i 6= j; i, j = 1, 2 (6)
Further analysis requires the adoption of specific functional forms for the density of skills
g and the function mapping skills to tasks t. Roy (1951) assumed that these are such that the
tasks are log-normal i.e. (ln t1, ln t2) have a mean (µ1, µ2) and co-variance matrix Σ (with elements
denoted by σij) . Denoting a zero-mean, normal vector by (u1, u2) the workers choose between two
wages:
lnw1 = lnπ1 + µ1 + u1 (7)
lnw2 = lnπ2 + µ2 + u2
If for the worker lnw1 + ln [1− k1(L)] > lnw2 +ln [1− k2(L)] he or she enters sector 1. If the
converse is true he or she enters sector 2.
With these functional specifications the proportion of workers in sector i is given by:2
pr(i) = P (lnwi + ln [1− ki(L)] > lnwj + ln [1− kj(L)]) = Φ(ci) (8)
i 6= j; i, j = 1, 2
where Φ(·) is the cdf of a standard normal variable and
ci =
ln πi
πj
+ ln [1−ki(L)][1−kj(L)] + µi − µj
σ∗
, i 6= j (9)
σ∗ =
q
var(ui − uj)
The proportion of workers in sector i will increase as the task price πi in that sector gets
relatively higher, as relative travel costs for the sector ki(L) decline, or as the mean of the task µi
gets relatively bigger. In addition it depends on the variance and co-variance terms in Σ via σ∗.
2The following equations are based on the properties of incidentally truncated bivariate normal distributions.
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2.2 Patterns of Self-Selection
Post-selection the conditional mean and variance of the sectorial wage distribution can be charac-
terized; note that these will also characterize the observed distribution if the model holds true:
E (lnwi | lnwi + ln [1− ki(L)] > lnwj + ln [1− kj(L)]) = lnπi + µi +
σii − σij
σ∗
λ(ci) (10)
var (lnwi | lnwi + ln [1− ki(L)] > lnwj + ln [1− kj(L)]) = σii



ρ2i [1− ciλ(ci)− λ2(ci)]
+(1− ρ2i )


(11)
i 6= j; i, j = 1, 2
where:
ρi = correl(ui, ui − uj), i 6= j; i, j = 1, 2
λ(ci) =
φ(ci)
Φ(ci)
with φ(·) denoting the density of a standard normal variable. The term λ(c), denoted the inverse of
“Mill’s ratio” or the hazard rate in reliability theory, has the following properties, with sub-scripts
denoting partial derivatives:
λ(c) ≥ 0
λc < 0 λcc > 0
lim
c→∞
λ(c) = 0 lim
c→−∞
λ(c) =∞
This set-up provides for a rich set of outcomes. The focus here is on issues that will be
relevant to the empirical work below. The discussion which follows refers to equations (10)-(11)
i.e. to the two moments of the conditional log-normal wage distribution.
2.2.1 Mean and Variance of Log Wages
Equation (10) shows that the post-selection mean wage diﬀers from the unconditional mean, which
obtains under random assignment. The diﬀerence is given by the term σii−σij
σ∗ λ(ci). This term has
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two elements: (i) Selectivity as expressed by λ(ci). Note that if all workers choose sector i, then
λ(ci) = 0 and so the task mean becomes lnπi + µi. (ii) The relation between the variance of the
sectorial distribution σii and the co-variance with the other sector σij , which is reflected in the
term σii−σij
σ∗ .
Regarding the variance, note from equation (11), that the sectorial variance observed is
smaller than the population variance of the relevant log task, as the term [1 − ciλ(ci) − λ2(ci)] is
less than or equal to 1. Generally, sectorial variances decrease with increased selection. Suppose
for example that ρi 6= 0 for each sector and π1π2 increases, so people move from sector 2 to 1. Thus
selection increases in Sector 2 and declines in Section 1. In this case c1 increases and c2 declines;
with λ(ci) being a convex, decreasing function of ci the term [1 − ciλ(ci) − λ2(ci)] increases for
i = 1 and declines for i = 2. Thus the conditional variance increases in 1 and declines in 2.
Only when ρi = 0 (which requires σii = σij) will the variance of log task i actually employed in
sector i (variance of the post-selection distribution) be identical to the variance of log task i in the
population.
2.2.2 The Wage Distribution and Sorting Patterns
It is possible to classify the selection outcomes in terms of the relations between the elements of
Σ: σ11, σ22 and σ12 or alternatively between
√
σ22√
σ11
and ρ12 =
σ12√
σ11
√
σ22
.3 Assuming, without loss of
generality, that σ22 ≥ σ11,the diﬀerent outcomes depend on the relation between the ratio of the
standard deviation in each sector
√
σ11√
σ22
and the correlation between the two sectorial distributions
ρ12.
Three cases are possible (remarking that ρ12 is bounded from above by 1 ≤
√
σ22√
σ11
) :
(i) The correlation between the sectors is positive and relatively high, i.e. ρ12 ≥
√
σ11√
σ22
. In
3Note the following definitions which will appear below:
ρ1 =
σ11 − σ12√σ11σ∗
ρ2 =
σ22 − σ12√σ22σ∗
ρ12 =
σ12√σ11
√σ22
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this case the term σii−σij
σ∗ in equation (10) is positive for sector 2 and negative for sector 1. Thus
the conditional mean in sector 2 (sector 1) is higher (lower) than the unconditional mean, lnπi+µi
(note that λ(ci) is positive). Selection is positive in sector 2 and negative in sector 1. Note that
the Roy model cannot have negative selection in the two sectors (as σ11+σ22−2σ12 ≥ 0). Because
of the high correlation, this is a comparative advantage case rather than absolute advantage, i.e.
workers who do well in a certain sector may still select the other one and workers may select a
sector that they do badly in.
(ii) The correlation between the sectors is negative, i.e. ρ12 < 0 . In this case the term
σii−σij
σ∗ in equation (10) is positive for each sector so the conditional mean in each sector is higher
than the unconditional mean. This is a case of positive selection in the two sectors or of absolute
advantage — each sector tends to be filled with the workers that perform best in the sector.
(iii) The correlation between the sectors is positive but relatively low, i.e. 0 ≤ ρ12 <
√
σ11√
σ22
.
In this case too the term σii−σij
σ∗ in equation (10) is positive for both sectors, and in each sector there
is positive selection, though it is once more comparative and not absolute advantage which dictates
selection. Note that this case includes ρ12 = 0, i.e. the endowment of tasks are uncorrelated.
One can interpret this set-up as follows: when the correlation ρ12 is negative, workers self-
select in terms of absolute advantage, i.e. they go to the sector suited for their skills. When the
correlation is positive, then comparative advantage applies. The latter case breaks down into two
sub-cases: when the correlation is moderate, self-selection induces positive selection eﬀects in the
two sectors via worker sorting by comparative advantage. When the correlation is suﬃciently high,
some workers will work in a sector which is not well suited for them; hence there will be a negative
selection eﬀect for those workers.
Case (i) would be more likely to occur than the other two, the lower is the variance in sector
1 (σ11) or the higher is the co-variance between the sectors (σ12).
Willis and Rosen (1979) and Willis (1986) discuss the nature of the correlation ρ12. They
point out that there is a diﬀerence between a one-dimensional approach, whereby skills reflect one
factor such as IQ, and a multi-dimensional approach, whereby there are diﬀerent abilities that have
diﬀerential importance in diﬀerent tasks. Examples would be strength, agility, dexterity, creativity,
intelligence, visual acuity, etc. They define case (i) above as “hierarchical sorting” — those in the
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high-wage sector are drawn from the upper portion of the potential earnings distribution while those
in the low-wage sector are drawn from the lower portion of the potential earnings distribution, and
cases (ii) and (iii) as “non-hierarchical sorting.” These terms relate to Roy’s (1951) notion of a
hierarchy of occupations that is aﬀected by the ability variances.
Note that task prices and mean abilities operate through c and λ(c). They do not determine
the afore cited selection patterns but they do aﬀect the magnitude of selection.
2.2.3 Sorting Patterns in Immigration
Borjas (1987) oﬀered a classification of the afore-cited outcomes in terms of immigration selection
patterns:
a. Positive selection of immigrants — when the host economy has greater wage inequality
(i.e. the higher σii) and the correlation between economies (ρ12) is relatively high, then the “best”
workers leave the home economy and perform well in the host economy (i.e. negative selection at
home and positive selection of migrants going to the host economy).
b. Negative selection of immigrants — when the home economy has the greater wage inequal-
ity and ρ12 is relatively high then the immigrants come from the lower tail of the home distribution
and these immigrants do not perform well in the host economy (i.e. positive selection at home and
negative selection of migrants going to the host economy).
Both these cases correspond to the one classified as (i) above, each case defining sector 1
and sector 2 diﬀerently. The key point here is that it matters which economy has the bigger wage
inequality.
c. ‘Refugee sorting’ — the correlation is relatively low so the host economy draws below
average immigrants but they do well in the (host) economy. These are cases (ii) and (iii) above
with positive selection in each sector.
Borjas (1999, p. 1715) cites empirical evidence, mostly related to the U.S., in support of
the negative selection case outlined above. We return to re-examine this literature after reporting
and analyzing the results.
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3 Background for the Empirical Analysis
This section provides a brief background for the empirical analysis which follows. It presents key
facts on the Palestinian economy and its labor market (3.1), discusses the stylized facts on migrant
workers in the Western world, defining the work of Palestinians in Israel in this context (3.2), and
reports pertinent results from the literature (3.3).
3.1 The Palestinian Economy and Its Labor Market
The West Bank and the Gaza Strip — the constituents of the Palestinian economy — are occupied
by Israel since June 1967. There is a substantial diﬀerence in the degree of development between
the economies: in the sample period, GDP per capita in the Palestinian economy was 16% of the
Israeli figure. In 1968 Palestinian workers started to flow to employment in Israel and the labor
market turned out to be the major link between the two economies. The share of salaried employees
employed in Israel started oﬀ at 22% in 1970, climbed to around 50% three years later, and then
fluctuated between 49% and 61%, till starting to fall oﬀ in the late 1980s. In the period 1970-1993
it averaged 52%.
Beginning in December 1987 these labor links underwent a series of severe shocks: at the
latter date a popular uprising (the first ‘intifada’) broke out against the occupation, leading to
strikes, curfews and new security regulations, such as occasional closures of the territories. In 1993,
following peace negotiations, the Oslo accords were signed, giving the Palestinians autonomous
control over parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In September 2000 a second uprising
broke out, with even greater ensuing turbulence. Consequently Palestinian employment in Israel
since the end of 1987 was much more volatile and, generally, on a declining trend.
Men constitute the bulk of the labor force. Participation rates for men aged 14 and above
have increased from around 63% in the early 1980s to over 70% by the mid-1990s. All the while
women have had low participation rates — 7% on average, with little variation.
In this paper we use data on male workers from 1987, a period of high Palestinian labor
market involvement pre-dating the events cited above. We elaborate more on the sample period
choice below.
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3.2 Palestinians as Migrant Workers
In order to place the Palestinian migrant workers in broader context, it is useful to note three key
facts on migrant workers in developed economies:
(i) The share of foreign residents in developed economies has generally increased in the
post-war period and in particular in the 1990s. Zlotnik (1998, Table 1) reports that foreign-born
population as a share of total population in developed countries has increased from 3.1% in 1965
to 4.5% in 1990. In Western Europe the rise in that period was from 3.6% to 6.1%; in Northern
America from 6.0% to 8.6%. From 1988 to 1998 the share of foreign or foreign born population in
20 OECD economies (OECD (2001, Table 2)) has further risen from 5.7% to 6.9%.
(ii) Migration into developed economies has seen a big increase in the share of migrants
from developing economies. Zlotnik (1998, Tables 3 and 4) reports that the share of migrants from
developing economies in the total migration annual flow, going from the 1960s to the 1990s, has
risen from 42% to 80% in the U.S.,4 from 12% to 78% in Canada, from 25% to 31% in Germany,
and from 46% to 79% in the Netherlands.
(iii) The share of low-skill migrant workers in developed economies is substantial. OECD
(2003, page 45) reports that the percentage of the population with lower secondary education
is typically higher among foreigners than among natives; thus, for example, it is 30.1% among
foreigners in the U.S. as compared to 9.3% among natives (in 2000-2001); the numbers for France
are 66.7% vs 34.9%, for Germany 48.5% vs 15.1%, and for the U.K. 30.1% vs. 18.8%.
Palestinian employment in Israel can be seen as a case of phenomena (ii) and (iii): low
skill migrant workers (as shown below) from a developing economy working in a developed one.
This classification is further evidenced by the substitution that took place in the course of the
1990s: in 1990, Palestinian workers constituted 8.8% of business sector employment in Israel, while
only 0.1% were non-Palestinians. Since then — due to the political turbulence — the Palestinian
share has fallen, reaching 1.5% in 2002; concurrently the share of non-Palestinian migrant workers,
coming from Eastern Europe, East Asia and West Africa, rose, reaching 12.6% in 2002 [Bank of
Israel (2003, page 141)]. The non-Palestinian workers — all of them low-skilled — entered the same
4Sp ecifically in the U.S. almost 48% of immigrants came from Hispanic countries in the period 1991-1999 compared
to less than 25% in 1951-1960 [see INS (1999, Table 2)].
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industries in which the Palestinians had previously worked. This substitution is evident also at
the micro level: in the construction sector, which a major industry for migrant workers in Israel,
Palestinians constituted 43% of employment in 1992 with no other migrant workers; by 1996 the
Palestinian share fell to 12% while the non-Palestinian share stood at 26% employed at the same
occupations within the industry [Amir (1999)].5
3.3 Results from the Literature on the Palestinian Labor Market
Three findings from previous literature on the Palestinian labor market are pertinent to the issues
examined here:
In a descriptive analysis, Kleiman (1992) suggested that it is mostly unskilled and inexpe-
rienced labor that tended to flow to work in Israel. A certain part of it came to specialize in work
in Israel, as evidenced by relatively long employment spells. The key demographic characteristic of
these workers was the young age.
Angrist (1996) estimated a short-run Israeli demand function for Palestinian labor, finding
it relatively inelastic. Till 1990 movements along this demand curve can explain the fall in the daily
wage premium for working in Israel from 18% in 1981 to zero in 1984 and its subsequent rise to as
high as 39% in 1989. These changes paralleled supply changes — Palestinian absences from work
due to the uprising and events associated with it. Note that, taken together with the data on the
substitution of Palestinians by non-Palestinians in the 1990s, this implies that there was inelastic
demand in Israel for migrant workers in certain industries.
Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein (1987) proposed the view that Palestinian workers entered
occupations in Israel that were low in social status and remained there. Having little ability to
negotiate employment conditions and few alternatives, they were given less desirable jobs enabling
other ethnic groups to move up the occupational ladder in Israel.
5Fo r further discussion and analysis of this substitution see Friedberg and Sauer (2004). For an extensive account
of migration to Israel see Cohen and Eckstein (2004).
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4 Data, Methodology and Results
In this section we estimate the wage equations, corrected for self-selection, for Palestinians working
in Israel and East Jerusalem as one sector and working locally (in the West Bank and Gaza) as the
other sector. In what follows we discuss the data (4.1), the econometric methodology (4.2), and
alternative specifications (4.3). We then report the results (4.4). The analysis and interpretation
are left to the subsequent sections.
4.1 The Data
The data are taken from the Territories Labor Force Survey (TLFS) conducted by the Israeli Central
Bureau of Statistics from 1968 to 1993 [see for example CBS (1996)]. Its principles are similar to
the Israeli Labor Force Survey done by the CBS, which is akin to other such surveys, such as the
U.S. Current Population Survey. The survey used a 1967 CBS-conducted Census as the sampling
frame, with a major update in 1987. It was conducted quarterly, using rotation groups (households
were randomly divided into four groups; each group was interviewed for two consecutive quarters,
excluded for two consecutive quarters and interviewed again for two consecutive quarters). The
survey included 6,500 households in the West Bank and 2,000 in Gaza, surveyed by local Palestinian
enumerators employed by the Israeli Civil Administration in the Territories. The TLFS contained
questions on demographics, schooling and labor market experience.
In this paper we use observations on Palestinian men6 aged 18-64 from the TLFS in the year
1987. This year represents the time of highest data quality (following the sample frame revision)
and, as mentioned, a high share of Palestinian employment in Israel. It was the last one before the
uprising and the ensuing turbulence.
Table 1 presents sample statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis.
6A smentioned, women had very low participation rates, and when working in the market economy, did so locally,
not in Israel.
15
4.2 Econometric Methodology
Estimation of equations (7) for workers employed locally and employed in Israel will yield estimates
of all the key elements of the model, i.e. lnπi, µi and the elements of Σ. To do that the following
procedure is used:
(i) Posit that ln ti = ciS where S is decomposed into observed and unobserved variables
So and Su, and ci their associated coeﬃcients, are cio and ciu, respectively. Thus equations (7)
become:
lnwi = lnπi + βiX + ui, i = 1, 2 (12)
where βi = cio,X = So and ciuSu = ui.
(ii) When estimating (12), take into account sample selection — which is inherent in the
model — using the methodology proposed by Heckman (1979). In what follows we briefly present
this methodology, referring the reader to the above reference for full details.
Define the variable z∗ :
z∗ = lnw1 + ln(1− k1(L))− lnw2 − ln(1− k2(L)) (13)
= lnπ1 − lnπ2 + ln(1− k1(L))− ln(1− k2(L)) + β1X − β2X + u1 − u2
and the indicator variable z :
z = 1 if z∗ > 0 (14)
z = 0 otherwise
According to the model we shall observe lnw1 only if z∗ > 0 i.e. when z = 1. Paralleling
(8) we have:
Pr(z = 1) = Φ(ln π1
π2
+ ln
(1− k1(L))
(1− k2(L))
+ β1X − β2X + u1 − u2) (15)
Pr(z = 0) = 1− Φ(ln π1
π2
+ ln
(1− k1(L))
(1− k2(L))
+ β1X − β2X + u1 − u2)
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Based on equations (10) - (11) we know that the observed lnw1 is thus given by:
lnw1 | (z = 1) = lnπ1 + β1X +
·
σ11 − σ12
σ∗
¸
λ (c1) + u1 (16)
This may also be written as follows:
lnw1 | (z = 1) = lnπ1 + β1X + ρ1
√
σ11λ (c1) + u1 (17)
A similar equation holds true for the other sector.
We estimate the model using either Full Maximum Likelihood or the Heckman two-step
procedure. Following Heckman (1979) one can interpret the selection bias in (12) as an omitted
variable bias. If λ (ci) is not included in the equation, the estimates of the vector of coeﬃcients βi
may be biased. The intuition is as follows: not including λ (ci) as a regressor ignores the influence
of all the variables in question on the dependent variable — which is the conditional wage — through
the self-selection process. This influence comes in addition to the direct eﬀect expressed by βi. Thus
the uncorrected OLS estimate does not take into account the co-variation between the variable xk
in question (education, for example) and the selectivity variable λ. The sign of the bias depends
on the eﬀect of xk on selection and on the eﬀect of selectivity on the dependent variable, i.e. on
wages in this case. The following equation expresses this bias formally. For any variable xk in X:
∂E(lnwi | (z = 1))
∂xk
= βik +
·
σii − σij
σ∗
¸
∂λ
∂ci
∂ci
∂xk
(18)
There are three components to the selectivity bias term (the second term on the RHS):
(i)
h
σii−σij
σ∗
i
— this is the term determining the type of selection taking place (based on
unobservables) as discussed above. Note that it can be negative (in one sector of case i above)
or positive (the other sector of case i and in cases ii and iii). This term expresses the eﬀect of
selectivity on wages.
(ii) ∂λ
∂ci
< 0 — this negative term expresses the relation between the selectivity regressor λ
and the proportion ci of the workers in the sector or the probability that an observation be included
in the sample; as this proportion (or probability) increases, the bias diminishes.
(iii) ∂ci
∂xk
— this term expresses the influence of the variable in question on selection. Note
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that Pr(z = 1) = Φ(σ∗ci). Thus the sign of this component is determined by estimates of the
selection equations (15).
The sign of the bias depends on the type of selection process (point i) and on the direction
of influence of the relevant variable on the sectorial selection (point iii). The magnitude depends
on these factors as well as on the ∂λ
∂ci
term.
4.3 Specification
For the task function variables X we use education and experience7 (employing for the latter a
linear quadratic formulation). In addition we use indicator variables for the quarters within 1987,
which we do not report. For the travel cost function k we postulate a linear function ki =
X
t
θt · lit
where l is the region where the person lives, t is the index of regions, and θ is a coeﬃcient to be
estimated in the selection equations (15). Approximating we get:
ln(1− ki) = ln(1−
X
t
θt · lit) ' −
X
t
θt · lit
The selection equations are thus:
Pr(z = 1) = Φ(ln π1
π2
+
X
t
θt · l2t −
X
t
θt · l1t + β1X − β2X + u1 − u2) (19)
Pr(z = 0) = 1− Φ(ln π1
π2
+
X
t
θt · l2t −
X
t
θt · l1t + β1X − β2X + u1 − u2)
The estimated wage equation is the following:
lnwi | sector i = lnπi + β0 + β1educ+ β21exp+ β22exp2
+
4X
m=2
γmQm +
·
σii − σij
σ∗
¸
λ (ci) + ui (20)
where i, j denote sectors, Q is an indicator variable for the quarter, and m denotes the quarter
number.
7E xperience being defined as age minus education minus 5.
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Note that the selection equations (19) contain both the X vector and the location variables,
while the wage equations (20) use the X vector alone, i.e. the location variables are excluded from
the wage equation.
The dependent variable is the log of real hourly wages, defined as the nominal monthly wage
divided by hours worked and deflated by the CPI.8 The use of hourly wages is designed to avoid
confounding the choice of work place with the choice of work time (hours or days).9 Education
and experience are defined in years. For location we use indicator variables for 10 regions of local
residence.10
To check for robustness, we look at the following alternative specifications of the equation,
with the benchmark being the above specification:
(i) Using OLS to test for the eﬀect of selection correction.
(ii) Not using any exclusion restrictions, i.e. omitting the location variables from the selec-
tion equations (15); this tests for the importance of the exclusion restrictions for identification.
(iii) Using a diﬀerent cutoﬀ monthly wage rate for the computation of the dependent vari-
able.
4.4 Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the results, the former reporting the estimates of the selection equation and
the latter reporting the estimates of the wage equation. In each case we report the point estimates
with standard errors in parentheses; in Table 3 we also report the implied second moments (ρi, σii
and ρ12), and two test statistics: the Wald test and the ρi = 0 test using χ
2(1), with P-values in
parentheses.
8Real, rather than nominal, wages are used as inflation was relatively high (16.1%) in the course of 1987.
9
 We delete observations of nominal monthly wages of less than 320 NIS. For these observations monthly wages
are extremely low, indicating that they are either measured with error or that they reflect very few hours of monthly
work. A similar procedure was employed by Heckman and Sedlacek (1985). Below, we test for robustness of this
cutoﬀ point.
10   The results of the selection equations (19) demonstrate that these locational variables are indeed significant.
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Across all specifications, the following results emerge:
(i) The constant of the equation is substantially higher in Israel.
(ii) While education and experience premia are “normal” in local employment, they are very
low in Israel employment. Consistent with this finding are the selection equation results, whereby
education and experience decrease the probability of choosing employment in Israel.
(iii) Estimates of the second moments indicate higher variance of the local latent skill
distribution and a negative correlation between the unobserved skill distributions.11
These results hold true across the columns of the tables. Diﬀerences across specifications,
while not changing the essential picture, deserve brief mention: first, and most importantly, there
is a significant role for selection correction; the uncorrected OLS estimates underestimate the skill
premia and overestimate the diﬀerence in the constant of the equation when comparing stayers
and migrants. We return to examine this selection bias below. Second, the exclusion restrictions
or the wage cutoﬀ point hardly matter for the coeﬃcient estimates; they do produce somewhat
diﬀerent estimates for the second moments but do not change the implied selection patterns. Third,
more substantial diﬀerences are found when comparing the Full Maximum Likelihood and the
Heckman two-step estimates; the latter imply higher skill premia (for both stayers and migrants),
a higher diﬀerence between education premia locally and in Israel, and a lower diﬀerence between
the constant of each regression.
We turn now to examine the implications of these results. In what follows we use the results
of column (1) of Table 3 as the benchmark results.
5 Selection Patterns
In this section we examine the implications of the results reported in Tables 2 and 3. We first look
at the premia: the constant of the equation, reflecting the migration premium, and the premia to
education and experience (5.1). We then look at the estimates of the elements of the
P
matrix and
discuss the implications with respect to selection patterns (5.2). Next we do a graphical analysis
11 In two specifications — reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 — the estimates of the second moments, while
indicating positive selection in both sectors (ρi > 0) and the same relationship between local and host variances (i.e.
σlocal > σhost), are inconsistent with σ∗ > 0 and −1 ≤ ρ12 ≤ 1.
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that combines the estimates of the return premia and of the second moments of unobserved skills;
this allows for a fuller account of the self-selection process (5.3). Finally, we draw the implications
with respect to the wage premium and wage inequality (5.4). The next section decomposes wage
diﬀerences across the local and host economies.
5.1 Migration Premium and Returns to Observed Skills
The wage equation’s intercept — reflecting the task price πi and the constant µi in the task function
— is substantially higher in Israel. Note that this “migration premium” is much higher than the
diﬀerence in mean wages between Israel and local employment: the diﬀerence in the constant of
the equation between Israel and local employment is 1.04 while the diﬀerence in average wages is
0.03 (both in terms of log real hourly wage). We analyze this diﬀerence in more detail below.
The following picture emerges with respect to the skill premia:
(i) Locally, schooling premia rise with years of education. In Israel these premia are close
to zero and the premia function is flat.
(ii) Locally the experience premia profile of earnings has the familiar hump-shape while in
Israel it is again flat and around zero.
Thus while local premia for education and experience behave “normally,” employment in
Israel oﬀers low — basically zero — rewards for these attributes. However, for given skills Israel oﬀered
higher wages (as reflected in the constant). Less educated and less experienced workers therefore
chose to work in Israel; those with better skills chose to work locally and were compensated for
the wage diﬀerential by the local returns given to their skills. This represents negative selection on
observed skills.
This sorting pattern implied by the results of estimation is borne out in the actual, observed
locational distributions by education and age. Table 1 has presented key moments for  edu-
cation and experience.  Table 4 oﬀers additional evidence by describing the distribution
of workers across work locations by education and age:
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The table confirms that it is indeed the less educated and younger workers who worked
relatively more in Israel. Locally, mean schooling and age are higher. Particularly striking are
the results for the high schooling group, where the share of workers is substantially higher in local
employment.
There are several implications to these patterns:
First, the returns to the same skills diﬀer markedly for migrant and stayers. The local
economy rewards education and experience substantially more. This phenomenon can be explained
by looking more closely at the types of jobs in each economy. Table 5 shows the distribution of
employment across industries and occupations.
Local employment is characterized by industries and occupations that presumably require
the performance of more complex tasks. In particular, government, personal, and financial services
are about 40% of local employment. In Israel, employment is highly concentrated (over 80%) in
three industries — construction, manufacturing and agriculture. In terms of occupations, 21% of
local workers are employed in high-skilled occupations (the top three in the table) vs. 2% in such
occupations in Israel. Hence it is not surprising that local employment oﬀers higher rewards for
education and experience.
Second, the absence of returns to experience in the Israeli economy is consistent with the
findings of Dustmann and Meghir (2003), who studied returns to experience (on several dimensions)
for young German workers. They found that much of the return to unskilled workers is due to such
workers finding good matches and remaining with them. The case of unskilled Palestinians in
Israel is likely to violate both requirements — there is no search process for good matches and the
employment relationship is not of long duration.
Third, the results indicate that aggregation in these circumstances produces a misleading
picture. Running regular OLS regressions for the entire Palestinian labor market, including both
local workers and migrant workers in Israel, yields a return to education of 1.9% in the aggregate
economy. According to the selectivity corrected estimates reported in Table 3 these were 4.8%
locally and about zero in Israel. The return to experience is 1.2% overall in the simple aggregate
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OLS regressions. In the corrected regressions of Table 3 they were 2.9% locally and again about zero
in the Israeli economy. Thus simple OLS regressions of the entire economy obscure the diversity of
returns. The corrected regressions yields estimates that are much higher for workers employed in
the local economy and much lower for workers in the host (Israeli) economy.
5.2 Self-Selection and Unobserved Skills Distributions
Table 3 has reported estimates of the unobserved skills variance-co-variance matrix             (
P
)
 produced by estimation. These allow for the analysis of the self-selection process. As discussed in
sub-section 2.2. above, a key issue is the relationship between the correlation of the unobserved
skill distributions in the two sectors (ρ12) and relative skill variances
√
σ11√
σ22
. The results indicate
that:
(i) The correlation ρ12 is negative.
(ii) The variance in local employment is higher than that of employment in Israel.
These results are reasonable: the negative correlation is probably due to the fact that local
and Israeli occupational tasks diﬀered, as discussed above. In particular, government employment
was predominant locally and required very diﬀerent skills than those needed for the occupations that
dominated employment in Israel — construction, manufacturing and agriculture. The latter require
skills that are less dispersed than those in the more high-skilled occupations of local employment —
an “anybody can do it” eﬀect — hence the lower variance in Israel employment.
As a consequence selection was positive in each sector. This corresponds to case (ii) dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.2 above, with positive selection due to absolute advantage. It constitutes the
“refugee sorting” case in the Borjas (1987) terminology.
These results lend support to the afore-cited approach of Willis and Rosen (1979), who
examined the earnings of U.S. college graduates vs. high-school graduates. They found positive
selection in both groups, as we do here. They interpret this result as a rejection of the one factor
model for skills and of the ability bias findings in previous literature. Instead, they argue that the
results point to a multiple factor model and non-hierarchical sorting via self-selection. The similarity
of their findings and the results here pertains not only to the finding of positive self-selection in
both sectors, but also to the identity of the sectors in terms of the type of jobs oﬀered. One sector —
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in their case the college graduate jobs sector, here the local one — oﬀers jobs that require relatively
high education. The other sector — high school graduate jobs in their case, employment in Israel
here — oﬀers jobs that require relatively low levels of education. Hence, the more educated workers
self select in both cases to the former sector and the less educated to the latter sector, implying
negative self-selection on observed skills. However, conditional on observed skills, unobserved skills
distributions are such that there is positive self-selection.
How important is the selection bias? Figure 1 reports the education and experience coeﬃ-
cients for the wage equations using OLS not corrected for sample selection bias (column 5 of Table
3) as well as the coeﬃcients of the corrected equations (column 1 of Table 3).
The figure reveals a substantial and systematic downward bias for the local economy and
an upward bias for the Israeli economy. This is consistent with the afore-cited selection patterns.
In terms of equation (18) the term ∂ci
∂xk
is positive locally, negative in Israel. Thus experience and
education premia are overstated in the Israeli economy and understated in the local economy if
one does not control for selection bias. As a result, the diﬀerence between migrants and stayers
is understated in the uncorrected regressions. This is akin to the understatement of the college
premium when the two sectors are college graduates and high-school graduates and when selection
is positive in each sector (see Willis and Rosen (1979)). Note that this bias is important in the
context of studying the labor market performance of migrants. While this issue is not at the focus
of the current paper, the extent of the bias is noteworthy.
5.3 The Roles of Observables and Unobservables
To see the role of the diﬀerent elements of the self-selection process, consider the following regression
equation:12
12  Derived from multiplying both sides of the equation ln t1 = µ1 + u1by σ12σ11 and subtracting from ln t2.
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ln t2 = µ2 +
σ12
σ11
(ln t1 − µ1) + ε2 (21)
=
µ
µ2 −
σ12
σ11
µ1
¶
+
σ12
σ11
ln t1 + ε2
where:
var ε2 = σ22[1−
σ212
σ11σ22
]
In log task (ln t2− ln t1) space this regression is shown in Figure 2 (based on the
discussion in Heckman and Sedlacek (1985, Figures 1 and 2)):
The figure has the following elements:
(i) For any given worker, the log task value in the local sector is given by a value of ln tlocal
on the horizontal axis.
(ii) The regression line (the downward-sloping line in the figure) gives the linearly predicted
log task value in the Israel sector, i.e. predicted ln tIsrael. It has the intercept given by µIsrael −
σlocal,Israel
σlocal
µlocal
13, and the slope is given byσlocal,Israel
σlocal
(iii) Actual values lie along the normal distribution around the regression line, as shown in
two places in the figure; note that the distributions plotted relate to the vertical ln tIsrael values.
The data points are distributed — conditional on the ln tlocal value — with var εIsrael.
(iv) The regression line and the normal distribution are plotted using the point estimates
of the parameters reported in Table 3, column 1.14
(v) The other line in the figure is the 45 degree line serving as the line of equal income
(wlocal = wIsrael). It starts from a negative intercept as πIsrael > πlocal. When the worker has a
value below this line he chooses the local sector; above it, he chooses to work in Israel.
13
 We use the point estimates of the coeﬃcients, and the sample means of the X variables, to generate µlocal and
µIsrael. We adopt the normalization of β0 = 0.
14 Equal income means lnw1 = lnw2 or lnπ1 + ln t1 = lnπ2 + ln t2. Hence it is given by ln t2 = lnπ1 − lnπ2 + ln t1.
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Using the actual estimates, the figure shows the positive selection in each sector. In terms
of equation (10) this means that in each sector E(lnwi | lnwi > lnwj) > E(lnwi). Graphically this
is seen by noting that when individuals are classified according to their task value, the fraction of
people working locally increases as the local task level increases. As one moves up the ln tlocal axis,
the fraction of workers selecting the local sector rises. To see the positive selection for the Israeli
economy consider the alternative regression (not plotted) of ln tlocal on ln tIsrael and note that there
too the slope is negative as σlocal,Israel < 0.
The figure shows the role of the migration premium through the position of the wlocal =
wIsrael line, the role of observable skill premia through the intercept term of the regression line, and
the role of unobservable skills through the intercept and slope of the regression line and through
the variance of the distribution at each point.
Three major features of the estimates are manifested in the figure: (i) µIsrael < µlocal so the
intercept of the regression line is relatively low; (ii) σlocal,Israel
σlocal
< 0 so the regression slope is negative;
and (iii) πIsrael > πlocal so the line of equal income starts from below 0. All of these features are
reasonable: µIsrael < µlocal as the host (Israeli) economy does not reward skills (education and
experience) in the low-skill occupations oﬀered; there is a negative correlation between unobserved
skills required in these occupations, as discussed above; and the host economy, being richer and
presumably more productive, has a higher task price i.e. πIsrael > πlocal.15
It is of interest to consider the eﬀects of possible changes in the parameters that determine
selection patterns:
(i) When the migration premium rises, i.e. when πhost
πlocal
rises, the line of equal income shifts
downwards. Fewer workers choose the local economy and more migrate.
(ii) When the skill premia in the host economy decline, i.e. µhost falls, the intercept declines
and the regression line shifts downwards. Now more workers choose local employment.
(iii) When the local (source economy) distribution becomes more dispersed, i.e. σlocal rises,
several changes take place: the intercept rises and the slope declines (in absolute value) so the
regression line rises and flattens. In addition, the variance of the normal distribution around the
line rises. The overall eﬀect is ambiguous.
15  According to (3), higher aggregate productivity ∂F
i
∂Ti
implies higher πi.
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(iv) When the co-variance of the skills across the two economies declines, i.e. σlocal,host falls,
the same happens: the regression line shifts up and flattens and the normal distribution becomes
more dispersed. Again, the overall eﬀect is ambiguous.
(v) When the host country distribution becomes less dispersed, i.e. σhost falls, the variance
of the normal distribution falls. The overall eﬀect is once more ambiguous.
Hence eﬀects (i) and (ii) are contradictory — a higher migration premium oﬀsets lower skill
premia. Eﬀects (iii), (iv) and (v) yield ambiguous outcomes. This implies that if occupational
tasks oﬀered to migrant workers were to become more complex then σhost, σlocal,host and µhost are
all likely to rise. But only eﬀect (ii) in reverse — the rise in µhost — would unambiguously lead to
more migration. Eﬀects (iv) and (v) in reverse are ambiguous, implying that this change will not
necessarily lead to more migration.
5.4 Selection Quantified
Selection induces a rise in mean wages and a reduction in wage inequality (measured by the standard
deviation) relative to random assignment. In Table 6 we report these eﬀects using the estimates of
Table 3 (column 1). The row marked wage premium 1 is the diﬀerence between observed, actual
mean wages and the predicted mean, i.e. dlnπi + bµi, in terms of log real hourly wages The latter
would be the mean wage without selection, i.e. with random assignment. No selection eﬀects
would yield a zero diﬀerence. For wage inequality (reported in the third row), we divide the
observed standard deviation by the estimated one (i.e. d√σii). Without selection, i.e. with random
assignment, this latter ratio would be 1 (see the discussion in 2.2.1 above). Figure 3 shows the
relevant distributions graphically16.
The table and the figure show very substantial selection eﬀects: a wage premium of 0.4 for
local employment and around 0.2 for Israel employment. This means that while there is a positive
selectivity eﬀect in both sectors, it was stronger for local employment. There was a 25% reduction
in wage inequality.
16T he selection log-normal distributions are depicted using the actual sample moments.
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The second row in Table 6 shows another form of wage premium: it is the diﬀerence between
the actual mean wage and the counterfactual: the predicted mean wage if local workers were to
migrate (shown in the working locally column) and if migrant workers were to stay (shown in the
working in Israel column). The former diﬀerence is about 0.2. It suggests that stayers are better oﬀ
not migrating because the higher migration premium would not be suﬃcient to compensate for the
lack of skill premia. The diﬀerence for migrant workers is 0.5; it suggests that if migrant workers
were to work locally, though they will get premia for their skills, the absence of the migration
premium would be bigger than this skill premia gain. These counterfactual comparisons are the
result of the interaction of work location, the distributions of skills engendered by self-selection,
the migration premium, and skill premia.
6 Decomposing The Wage Diﬀerential
The estimates allow us to decompose the wage diﬀerential between the two economies. The idea
is to quantify the relative role played by the diﬀerent elements of the model — task prices, skill
premia, skill levels, and selectivity eﬀects. We do this using actual data and the estimates of Table
3. We follow the methodology proposed by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and decompose the wage
diﬀerential between the Israeli economy and the local economy into components: a part due to task
prices plus the intercept of the task function (i.e. the constant in the wage equation); a part due
to diﬀerences in skill premia across the two sectors; a part due to diﬀerences in skill levels across
the two sectors; and a part due to diﬀerences in selection eﬀects. This is done on average values as
follows:
lnw2 − lnw1 = bk2 − bk1
+X1(bβ2 − bβ1) (22)
+bβ2(X2 −X1)
+bρ2 d√σ22cλ2 − bρ1 d√σ11cλ1
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where lnwi is the mean log hourly wage in economy i,bki = lncπ0+cβ0 for economy i using the point
estimates of the wage equation’s constant, bβi is a vector of the point estimates of the coeﬃcients
in economy i, Xi is a vector of the mean values of the independent variables in economy i, andbρi d√σii bλi are the estimates of the second moments times the average of the estimated inverse of
Mills’ ratio, all derived from the equations estimated in Table 3 (column 1).
There are two striking results: one is that the actual mean wage diﬀerential (in real hourly
wage terms) between the economies is small, only 3%. The other is that this latter finding masks
big disparities: there is a high constant diﬀerential in favor of the Israeli economy oﬀset by all the
other terms in the decomposition. The main oﬀset comes from the skill premia diﬀerential (bβ2−bβ1)
in favor of local employment. The oﬀset due to skill levels diﬀerences (X2 −X1) or to diﬀerences
in the (positive) selection eﬀect is much smaller. The key implication emerging from the table is
that wage equalization across economies (i.e. Israel and the Palestinian economy, pertaining to
Palestinian workers) is attained through the assignment of workers by the self-selection process.
While clear disparities exist between the two economies — the migration premium and the wage
skill premia — these cancel out through self-selection.
7 Conclusions
The analysis has yielded a consistent pattern of self-selection for migrant workers who were oﬀered
work in relatively low-skilled occupations in a more developed economy. Basically, this pattern is
the following: a substantial migration premium coupled with no skill premia led workers to sort
themselves so that the relatively highly skilled worked in local, more complex tasks, while the low
skilled worked abroad in relatively simple tasks. There were no returns in the host economy to
key observed skills like education and experience, probably due to the nature of the job tasks in
question. This resulted in negative selection on observed skills. A significant migration premium
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was in place, due to the host economy being more developed than the source economy, luring
migrant workers. In terms of the model this is expressed by a higher task price. This migration
premium oﬀset the negative eﬀect of the absence of skill premia. Conditional on observed skills,
selection on unobservable skills was positive. This was due to the negative correlation between the
distributions of these skills in the two economies. The ensuing worker sorting was based on self
selection according to absolute advantage and led to a substantial increase in mean wages and a
significant decrease in wage inequality (relative to a random assignment). The negative correlation
can be explained by the very diﬀerent nature of occupations in the two economies and by the
idea that these unobserved skills are multi-dimensional. Hence the diﬀerent nature of jobs, oﬀered
to migrants and stayers, account for both the observed skill premia patterns and the relationship
between the unobserved skill distributions. Taken together, these estimates appear quite reasonable,
and fully consistent with the distributions of education, experience, occupations, and industries of
migrants and stayers.17
As this study restricted attention to a particular data set, it cannot claim more general
empirical implications. However, it describes a pattern of self-selection that seems plausible for
many other cases of low-skilled migrant workers from developing economies working in developed
ones. Therefore it puts into question some of the conclusions reached in the literature. This
is so even though many, if not all, patterns of the data here are in accord with what has been
reported elsewhere, i.e. low earnings of migrants in low-skill occupations. In particular, the findings
suggest that there is negative selection on observed skills but positive selection on unobserved skills
(conditional on observed skills), a distinction that is not clear, or even explored, in many papers.
In the formal terminology of the model, both the literature and this paper find that σlocal
σhost
> 1.
The literature claiming negative self-selection then implies that σlocal
σhost
> ρlocal,host >
σhost
σlocal
often
with no direct evidence on ρ. A related problem is the assumption, sometimes made, that in the
host economy, natives and migrants have the same task distribution; this may have led to erroneous
conclusions with respect to the above comparison (i.e. mostly with respect to ρlocal,host). The results
17  Another application of the concept of self-selection to questions of immigration was suggested recently by Berman
and Rzakhanov (2000). Their analysis pertains to fertility decisions combined with migration decisions. While this
kind of analysis is not empirically relevant here, in a more general context their ideas can serve to strengthen the
argument made here about a migration premium.
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here18 indicate that σlocal
σhost
> σhost
σlocal
> ρlocal,host, hence positive self-selection on unobservables. This
then implies that migrant skill premia are overestimated, which has important implications for
the study of the economic performance of immigrants. It also seems as though the literature has
not given suﬃcient attention to the diﬀerential role played by (i) migration premia due to the
diﬀerence between developed and developing economies, (ii) selection on observable skills, driven
by skill premia diﬀerentials, and (iii) selection on unobservable skills, related to the diﬀerences in
job requirements.
The results imply that skill premia for the source economy (inclusive of migrant workers)
suﬀers from an aggregation bias, and that worker assignment through self selection leads to signifi-
cant reductions in wage inequality. The analysis of wage diﬀerentials shows that wages were almost
equalized due to this sorting pattern and the oﬀsetting eﬀects of migration premia and skill premia.
An important by-product that emerges from the current analysis relates to the literature
on education and self-selection. The results lend support to the approach advocated by Willis and
Rosen (1979) whereby unobserved skills are multi-dimensional and not highly correlated across
occupations.
The approach implemented and tested in this paper may have wider applications and im-
plications. One example is that it suggests a way of dealing with the increasingly important
phenomenon of job outsourcing. The workers choosing to work in such jobs (usually high-skilled)
could be characterized by (i) a developed vs. developing country diﬀerence, akin to the migration
premium; (ii) selection on observable skills; and (iii) selection on unobservable skills.
18Based on estimates of these second moments.
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Table 1
Sample Statistics
1987
variable Working in the Local Economy Working in Israel
N 6,499 10,947
wage (hourly, in logs) -2.71 -2.68
(0.33) (0.30)
education (in years) 9.1 7.8
(4.6) (3.9)
experience (in years) 19.4 18.1
(12.9) (13.1)
regions of residence
Jenin 6% 7%
Nablus 14% 6%
Tulkarm 7% 13%
Ramallah 18% 14%
Jordan valley 2% 1%
Bethlehem 11% 12%
Hebron 21% 18%
Rafiah 2% 4%
Gaza 14% 16%
Khan Yunis 4% 10%
Notes:
1. For wages, education and experience, the table reports mean of variables with standard
deviations in parentheses.
2. The region of residence numbers are percentage of workers living in the region out of
total sample in the column.
i
Table 2
Selection Equation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full ML no exclusion restrictions wage cutoﬀ point two step
constant 1.26 1.46 1.13 0.89
(0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10)
education -0.088 -0.085 -0.084 -0.100
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
experience -0.036 -0.038 -0.031 -0.040
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
experience2/100 0.030 0.033 0.023 0.033
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Jenin 0.46∗ 0.59∗ 0.78∗
Nablus 0.05 -0.05 0.20
Tulkarm 0.84∗ 0.84∗ 1.17∗
Ramallah 0.07 0.08 0.58∗
Bethlehem 0.01 0.08 0.83∗
Hebron 0.03 0.07 0.58∗
Rafiah 0.32∗ 0.39∗ 1.13∗
Gaza 0.04 0.09 0.83∗
Khan Yunis 0.50∗ 0.49∗ 1.09∗
n 10,947 10,947 11,602 10,947
Notes:
1. The equation relates to the selection of employment in Israel. The alternative specifica-
tions are spelled out in Section 4.3.
2. Sample includes all wage earners except those with wages below 320 NIS a month, except
for column (3) where the wage cutoﬀ point is 200 NIS a month.
ii
3. n is the number of observations.
4. Standard errors of the coeﬃcients are in parentheses, except for the region of residence
variables where a star denotes significance at 1%.
5. The equations included dummy variables for quarters, which are not reported.
6. The baseline region of residence is the Jordan valley.
iii
Table 3
Wage Equation
Dependent variable: log real hourly wage
(1) (2) (3)
Full ML no exclusion restrictions wage cutoﬀ point
Local. Israel Local Israel Local Israel
constant -3.93 -2.89 -3.99 -2.93 -3.96 -3.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
education 0.048 -0.0042 0.050 -0.0055 0.048 -0.0042
(0.001) (0.0012) (0.001) (0.0012) (0.001) (0.0012)
experience 0.029 0.005 0.029 0.007 0.034 0.010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
experience2/100 -0.032 -0.014 -0.032 -0.016 -0.004 -0.018
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ρi 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.80 0.75 0.80
(0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
√
σii 0.440 0.390 0.462 0.365 0.427 0.402
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
√
σ11√
σ22
0.89 0.79 0.94
ρ12 -0.83 -0.22 o.a.r
6
n 6,499 10,947 6,499 10,947 7,085 11,602
Wald test (χ2) 1830 292 1844 281 1829 390
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ρi = 0 test (χ
2) 548 737 755 253 169 270
iv
(4) (5)
two step OLS
Local Israel Local Israel
constant -3.37 -2.97 -3.28 -2.98
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
education 0.033 0.006 0.031 0.010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
experience 0.022 0.013 0.020 0.015
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
experience squared/100 -0.025 -0.021 -0.024 -0.023
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
ρi 0.17 0.27
√
σii 0.303 0.299
√
σ11√
σ22
0.99
ρ12 o.a.r
6
n 6,499 10,947 6,499 10,947
Wald test (χ2) 1773 1570
(0.00) (0.00)
Notes:
1. Sample includes all wage earners except those with wages below 320 NIS a month, except
for column (3) where the cutoﬀ wage is 200 NIS a month.
2. The alternative specifications are spelled out in Section 4.3.
3. n is the number of observations in the regression.
4. Standard errors of the coeﬃcients are in parentheses.
5. The regressions included dummy variables for quarters, which are not reported.
6. The Wald test is distributed χ2 with 6 degrees of freedom The ρi = 0 test using χ
2(1) is
v
an LR test of the null hypothesis that ρi = 0. P-values appear in parentheses.
7. In the cases marked o.a.r=outside admissible range, the second moment estimates are
inconsistent with σ∗ > 0 and −1 ≤ ρ12 ≤ 1. This can be seen by using the relations:
ρ1 =
·√
σ11√
σ22
− ρ12
¸ √
σ22
σ∗
ρ2 =
·√
σ22√
σ11
− ρ12
¸ √
σ11
σ∗
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Table 4
Education and Age Distributions by Work Locations
a. Schooling Groups
School 0 School 1 School 2 School 3 School 4 School 5
Israel 7% 9% 22% 17% 38% 7%
Local 6% 9% 19% 13% 31% 22%
b. Age Groups
Age 1 Age 2 Age 3 Age 4 Age 5
Israel 39% 33% 15% 8% 5%
Local 28% 33% 21% 12% 6%
Notes:
1. Sample is the same as in Table 3 column 1.
2. Schooling groups are: no schooling (school 0), 1- 4 years (school 1), 5-6 years (school 2),
             7-8 years (school 3), 9-12 years (school 4) and 13 and more (school 5).
3. Age groups are 18-24 (age 1), 25-34 (age 2), 35-44 (age 3), 45-54 (age 4) and 55-64 (age
              5).
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Table 5
Industry and Occupation Distributions by Work Locations
a. Industry Distributions
industry Local Israel
agriculture 3% 11%
manufacturing 24% 20%
construction 22% 50%
commerce 5% 9%
government 34% 6%
transportation 6% 2%
personal services 3% 3%
finance 1% 0%
b. Occupation Distributions
occupation Local Israel
academic 7% 0%
professionals 13% 1%
managers 1% 1%
clerical workers 9% 1%
agents, sales and service 3% 2%
skilled jobs in agriculture 8% 12%
manufacturing and construction skilled jobs 37% 42%
unskilled 22% 42%
Notes:
1. Sample is the same as in Table 3 column 1.
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Table 6
Eﬀects of Selection
working locally working in Israel
wage premium 1: lnwactual − lnwrandom 0.39 0.21
wage premium 2: lnwactual − lnwcounterfactual 0.19 0.51
reduction in wage inequality observed standard deviation√
σii
0.75 0.77
Notes:
1.Sample is the same as in Table 3 column 1.
2 lnwactual is the sample mean.
3. For definitions of lnwrandom and lnwcounterfactual see Section 5.4.
ix
Table 7
Decomposition of the Wage Diﬀerential
lnwlocal − lnwIsrael = bklocal − bkIsrael
+XIsrael(bβlocal − bβIsrael)
+bβlocal(X local −XIsrael)
+bρlocal d√σlocal dλlocal − dρIsrael d√σIsrael dλIsrael
lnwlocal − lnwIsrael -0.03bklocal − bkIsrael -1.03
XIsrael(bβlocal − bβIsrael) 0.83bβlocal(X local −XIsrael) 0.09bρlocal d√σlocal dλlocal − dρIsrael d√σIsrael dλIsrael 0.18
Notes:
1.Sample is the same as in Table 3 column 1.
2 lnwlocal, lnwIsrael are sample means.
3. The other rows use the estimates of Table 3 column 1.
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Figure 1a Educ. premia corrected (solid) vs. uncorrected (dotted) [local (top, red), Israel
(bottom, blue)]
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Figure 1b: Exp. premia, corrected (solid) vs. uncorrected (dotted) [local (top, red), Israel
(bottom, blue)]
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Figure 2: Regression [downward sloping] and equal income [45 degree] lines
xiii
-1.5-2-2.5-3-3.5-4-4.5
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
log wage
density function
Figure 3a: Local employment: selection (solid) vs. random assignment (dotted)
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Figure 3b: Israel employment: selection (solid) vs. random assignment (dotted)
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